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The Post-Stalin Komsomol and the Soviet Fight for Third World Youth 
 
 
Fulfilling their international duty, Soviet youth volunteers joined the 
battle against fascism, for the freedom of republican Spain. Their 
strength was seen by the Japanese in the skies over China, and their 
courage was admired by the peoples of Europe during the Second World 
War. Today their traditions live on in those (young people) who are 
raising the Aswan Dam, helping to master new technologies and to 
liquidate illiteracy and disease in the newly awakened countries of Asia 
and Africa.1  	ǯ, October 1968 
 
Komsomol youth do not just observe international life, they take an 
active part in it.2 
Leonid Brezhnev, February 1967 
 
 
As an organisation whose fundamental purpose was to raise youth Ǯ
Marxism-Leninisǯǡfirst and foremost entrusted, and closely 
supervised, by the Communist Party to ensure young people grew up as good 
communists and loyal Soviet citizens. Accordingly, attention has mainly focused 
upon domestic themes in Komsomol work, such as its role in struggles against 
                                                        
1 M.M. Mukhamedzhanov et al eds. My internatsionalisty: dokumenty i materialy 
ǳǡ    ǡ      ǯ
svyazakh sovetskoi molodezhi i mezhdunarodnom molodezhnom dvizhenii (1918-
1971gg), Moskva: Molodaya gvardiya, 1972. p. 266-7. 
2 L.I. Brezhnev,  ǯ ǡ ǣ ǯ ǡ  ? ? ? ?ǡ Ǥ  ? ? ?Ǥ    ǯ    	
1967 plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee.  
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hooliganism and the growth of Western penetration of the USSR, or the ways in 
which it worked to inculcate desirable attitudes and behaviours.3 Nonetheless, in 
line with the wider goals of the Soviet project, it was from its very first stages 
involved in efforts to spread communist influence abroad. The nascent 
Komsomol was a founder member of the Young Communist International (or 
Youth Comintern) that was established in Berlin at the end of 1919, and would 
thereafter remain its central actor until that organisation was dissolved along 
with the Comintern, in 1943.  
 
Even while wartime prerogatives necessitated a hiatus in Soviet attempts to   ǡ  ǯ international work did not cease 
entirely. The Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth was created in the months 
following the Nazi invasion of 1941 and sought to publicise both the suffering 
and the heroic deeds of young people in the USSR in the defence of their 
homeland: exchanging communications and occasional delegations with foreign 
youth groups. It was, however, telling of declining Soviet engagement with the 
ouǯ  in power that this body, established for 
                                                        
3 On such aspects of Komsomol work, see, for example, B. LaPierre, Hooligans in 
ǯRussia: Defining, Policing and Producing Deviance during the Thaw, ǡ ? ? ? ?ǢǤǡǮǲ	ǳǣ
and the Youth Counter-   ? ? ? ?ǯǯǡJournal of Contemporary History, 
Vol. 40, No. 3 (2005), pp. 565- ? ? ?Ǣ
ǤǡǮ	ǣ
Initiative Clubs in the Post- ǯǡ Carl Beck Papers, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2012.    
 3 
the specific conditions of the Second World War, remained largely unchanged          ǯ Ǥ4 However, 
once Nikita Khrushchev began to revive the international dimensions of the 
communist project following ǯ   March 1953, and young people 
became an ever more prominent feature of Soviet political discourse, so the ǯgrew much more substantial.5  
 
 
Aside from the fact that both Aleksandr Shelepin and Vladimir Semichastnyi both 
made the switch from Komsomol First Secretary to KGB chairman during the 
1950s, the post-Stalin Komsomol has barely registered a mention in the 
scholarly literature on the Cold War.6 One notable exception to this has been ǯ
                                                        
4 On Soviet isolation and youth during the late Stalin years, see, in particular, J. 
Fürst, ǯs Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of 
Mature Socialism, Oxford University Press, 2010.  
5 On the Khrushchev era as a time of re-engagement with the outside world, see, 
for example, A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, ǯǣthe Inside Story of 
an American Adversary, New York: W.W. Norton, 2006.   
6 Neither man moved directly from the post of Komsomol First Secretary to KGB 
chairman, though in both cases the transition was a rapid one. See V. 
Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, Moskva: Vagrius, 2002, and L. Mlechin, 
Shelepin, Moskva: Molodaya gvardiya, 2009. Semichasǯ
, 
Yuri Andropov, also had a substantial Komsomol career, having served as First 
Secretary of the Komsomol in Soviet Karelia during the Second World War.  
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opinion around the Cuban Missile Crisis.7 Like a number of other authors, ǡ ǯ     ǡ  Ǯǯǡ   ǯ   Ǥ8 Such activity was, of course, a crucial facet of ǯǡ did not stop at the Soviet 
border.  
 
The reason why the Komsomol does not yet occupy a more substantial place in 
the historiography on the overseas aspects of the Soviet Cold War is surely 
anchored in its lack of political agency: this was, after all, an organisation that 
unashamedly served as handmaiden to the ruling Communist Party, and had 
precious little scope for its own policy initiatives, especially in regard to foreign 
activity. Even so, with the Cold War now a quarter-century over we are in an age 
where agency is no longer the be all and end all of examining the Soviet political 
system, since tǮ ǯ. Furthermore, as an institution the Komsomol also represents one of 
fairly few points at which we can start to knit together more traditional 
approaches to Cold War historiography with the emerging scholarly attention to 
the cultural competition that also characterised the period.  
 
                                                        
7  Ǥ ǡ Ǯ ǣ      ǯǡJournal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2014, pp. 29-61.  
8 See also A. Kassof, The Soviet Youth Programme: Regimentation and Rebellion, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
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ǯlised myriad offices beyond those of the 
CIA and the White House, so the Soviet effort incorporated much more than just 
the KGB and Kremlin.9 Leonid Brezhnev was surely issuing a rallying cry as much 
as he was making a statement of fact when he declared that the Komsomolǯ
international activity Ǯǯǡhis 
message was not wholly without substance.10 The Komsomol consistently made ǯ
its influence abroad during the Cold War. It helped to build and to consolidate 
international relationships, its size and vast resources made the Komsomol able 
to act on a truly global scale and to seize upon new opportunities with alacrity, 
and it boasted considerable experience in youth work from which many 
developing countries were eager to learn. 
 
A number of points raised here also help to flag up noteworthy similarities and 
differences in the way that the Cold War was conducted by the USA and USSR. As 
I show, there were multiple dynamics of Komsomol Cold War activity that bore 
likeness to those of public organisations in the West, such as the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF), the American Society for African Culture (AMCAR) and 
the National Student Association (NSA). Both sides created multi-faceted and 
sophisticated approaches to winning influence abroad, and both proved 
                                                        
9 Other Soviet public organisations worthy of research on their Cold War work   Ǯ ǯ ǯ   Ǯ   ǯǤ 
10 L. Brezhnev, ǯ, p. 207.  
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themselves skilled at debunking ǯ
the international arena. The differences between the two sides were also telling. 
The Soviet lack of ideological pluralism and the direct ties that linked the 
Komsomol to the decision-making elite in the Soviet system meant that its Cold 
War work showed an internal clarity of ideas and purpose that enabled its 
campaign for world youth to range especially widely: from cultural diplomacy 
and the embedding of intellectual orthodoxies through to outright ideological 
and military subversion. Like the US, the Soviet system proved far better at 
denigrating its opposite number than it did at producing compelling and 
attractive messages about its own social and political system, but the Soviet 
failure in this was on a far grander scale: a failure that ultimately extended to a 
growing number of young people inside the Soviet Union.11  
 
A last, key, theme to highlight    ǯ   
activity was very much a two-way street, serving important domestic ends as 
well as foreign ones. The bulk of its international work was conducted by a 
coterie of elite specialists, but there were important messages to be absorbed by 
all. In the opening lines of her work on the US Peace Corps Elizabeth Hoffman 
wrote of how that organisation told Americans what was best about their 
                                                        
11 On the US failure in this regard, see L. Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US 
Propaganda and the Cold War, p. 6. On the failure to propagate a fully convincing 
view of Soviet modernity, see, for example, K. Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How 
the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural Cold War, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2011.  
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country (its humanitarianism) and helped to frame its global mission as a moral ǡǮǯǤ12 The dynamics were of 
course rather different on the other side of the iron curtain, but there is little 
doubt that the foreign and domestic fronts were very much in conversation with 
one another there, too. This was, after all, one of only a few areas in which the 
Cold War competition was genuinely competitive. In fact, in a country where Ǯǯ   ailed as a vital quality to be inculcated in 
young people, and where utopian promises of abundance manifestly failed to 
deliver, this relationship between home and abroad was particularly important: 
offering an alternative discourse on the health of the socialist struggle and an 
often compelling narrative on the countryǯ.  
 
Spreading the word to the developing world 
 
At the beginning of July 1956 the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth was 
finally dissolved and a new body, the USSR Committee of Youth Organisations 
(KMO), was established in its place under the auspices of the Komsomol Central 
Committee.13 Although very much a facet of the Party-state apparatus, rather 
                                                        
12 See E. Cobbs Hoffman, All You Needs is Love: the Peace Corps and the Spirit of 
the 1960s, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 1-9.  
13 In December 1956 a second body was also created: the International 
Department of the Komsomol Central Committee. This was specifically for 
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than a genuinely autonomous body, its specific focus upon youth made this a 
distinctive part of the Soviet Cold War struggle. As stated in its founding 
documents, the basic duties of the KMO were to strengthen friendship and co-
operation between Soviet and foreign youth organisations, and to provide for the Ǯ    ǯǤ 	   ǡ ǡ ǯivity and its 
domestic aims. Indeed, official discourse regularly proclaimed that 
internationalism and love for the motherland were two parts of a single whole.14 
Starting with an October 1956 declaration of Komsomol solidarity with Egyptian 
youth in the face of British, French and Israeli aggression during the Suez crisis, 
the KMO spent the next three and a half decades working in open and 
clandestine operations to expand Soviet influence among young people the 
world over.15 That Komsomol howls of outrage on behalf of Egyptian youth came 
at almost exactly the same time as the brutal crushing of the Hungarian rising, 
                                                                                                                                                              
communication, co-ordination, and study of activity with the various youth 
movements of fellow socialist countries.  
14 ǡ  ǡ ǤǤ ǯǡ Soyuz molodykh lenintsev, Moskva: ǯǡ ? ? ? ?Ǥ 
15 M.M. Mukhamedzhanov et al eds. My internatsionalisty, p. 183-184. This 
declaration of solidarity also included a statement to the effect that Egypt was 
within its rights to nationalise the Suez Canal.  
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which caused significant disquiet among Soviet youth, may have been a 
coincidence, but such coincidences would happen more than once.16 
 
The Komsoǯs first high-profile international propaganda success came with 
the staging of the 1957 World Youth Festival in Moscow, during which over 
30,000 foreign youth visited the Soviet capital for a celebration of peace and 
friendship: an event that indicated to the Komsomol leadership the power of    Ǯ ǯ      
Africa, Latin America and elsewhere.17 As a number of recent scholars have 
argued, this was an event that did much to energise both Soviet youth and 
visitors from abroad.18 Within a little over a year the Komsomol Central 
Committee had founded a youth travel agency, known as Sputnik, and was Ǯ
the revolution      ǯ, and sending more and more 
                                                        
16 On unrest linked to events in Hungary, see, for example, B. Tromly, Making the 
Soviet Intelligentsia: Universities and Soviet Intellectual Life under Stalin and 
Khrushchev, Cambridge University Press, 2014; and R. Hornsby, Protest, Reform 
ǯ, Cambridge University Press, 2013.  
17 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 239, ll. 109-111.  
18 S Ǥ ǡ Ǯ  ? ? ? ?   	ǣ   ǡǡ  ǯǡ  ǤǤ « eds. Soviet State and 
Society under Nikita Khrushchev, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 46-65; T. 
Rupprecht, Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: the USSR and Latin America in the 
Cultural Cold War, Unpublished PhD thesis, European University Institute, 2012. 
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(exemplary) Soviet youth abroad to study, travel and to impress. Travel to other 
parts of the socialist world would always predominate, but reports were 
eventually being filed on groups travelling across Western Europe and as far 
afield as Algeria, Iraq, Japan, Tunisia, Iran and even the USA.19 This was, as the 
likes of Anne Gorsuch and Dian    ǡ Ǯ  ǯ: something that both sides were to make wide use of.20 
Most succinctly, a December 1958 ǯǮǡǯǤ21 
 
Freed from the shackles of Stalinist isolation, during a period in which the 
decolonisation process created great political flux across large swathes of the 
planet, the Komsomol was within a few years active right across the globe: often 
at the invitation of others.22 A sample of KMO correspondence from February 
1964, for example, gives a useful idea of the scope and frequency of Komsomol 
                                                        
19 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 2, d. 1088.   
20 See A. Gorsuch, All This is Your World: Soviet Tourism at Home and Abroad after 
Stalin, Oxford University Press, 2011; D. Koenker, Club Red: Vacation Travel and 
the Soviet Dream, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. 
21 RGASPI, f. m-5, op. 1, d. 3, l. 23. 
22 When, in February1964, a KMO group headed off to participate in the Second 
Congress of Latin American Youth in Chile, the leader of their delegation had 
already visited fifteen different countries on KMO work over the preceding six 
years. Another member of the travelling party was about to embark upon his 
nineteenth such trip. See RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 224s, ll. 52-55. 
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activity on the international scene. This included a request from Cuba to send a 
photo display on Soviet youth; a request to host a trio of representatives from 
the International Meeting of Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of North 
Kalimantan; a proposal from Bulgarian communist youth to establish a mutual 
exchange programme for journalists working in youth media; a party of six KMO 
staff (three political workers and three translators) setting off for a six-month  Ǣ     ǯ 
send a delegation to India; a party heading to Florence for a youth conference on 
peace, disarmament and national independence; and an invitation to attend the 
III Annual Congress of Nigerian Youth in Lagos.23 The scope of such activity 
would have been wholly unthinkable only a decade earlier. 
 
Within and amongst these items of correspondence one can piece together 
several interesting themes on the place of the Komsomol in the wider Cold War 
struggle. Included in its invitation for a KMO delegation to attend the Second     ǡ  ǡ   ǯ 
expressed an eagerness for Komsomol representatives to Ǯmiliarise themselves 
with life here and to discuss our strug ǯǤ24 This was just one of 
many examples in which groups from the developing world showed themselves 
eager to study the Soviet path of development. Having played a celebrated role in 
campaigns like the fight against illiteracy, the drive to industrialise the Soviet 
economy and the fight against fascism, the Komsomol seemingly had much to 
                                                        
23 RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 224s, ll. 1-157. 
24 RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 224s, l. 12.  
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teach those in the throes of deep political and social change: and it was always 
ready to do so. Young agricultural specialists, doctors, teachers, athletes and 
more besides were soon dispatched to the developing world to demonstrate 
good will and showcase Soviet prestige. In fact, the sheer diversity of the ǯ experience Ȃ from work in the modern metropolitan capital to the 
less developed Central Asian republics Ȃ meant that parts of its programme 
could be declared applicable to needs almost anywhere across the globe. 
 
Other aspects of KMO activity from February 1964 made plain both the extent to 
which competition for youth was more than just a sideshow in the Cold War, and 
the extent to which the Komsomol consciously staked out a place for itself in the 
on-going struggle. The request from the International Meeting of Solidarity with 
the Struggle of the People of North Kalimantan, for example, let it be known that 
their group had recently been received in China Ȃ by that time a bitter rival for 
ascendancy within the communist world. As with warming Indo-Soviet relations, 
the KMO visit to Mali was a clear outgrowth of (or perhaps reward for) friendly 
ties between the USSR and the Kaite regime there. Indeed, first secretary Sergei 
Pavlov had only recently been pressing the Communist Party leadership to 
sanction an expansion of Komsomol activity in West Africa so that the 
organisation might act as a counter-weight to burgeoning US Peace Corps 
activity in that part of the continent.25 While the Komsomol was in no position to 
                                                        
25 S. V. Mazov, Ǯ       ? ? ? ?- ? ? ǯǡNovaya i 
noveishaya istoriya, No. 2, 2007, p. 87. At the time, Pǯ 
involvement in West Africa fell through on grounds of finance, but it had 
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initiate changes in the direction of Soviet foreign policy, its aid and expertise 
certainly did help to build bridges and consolidate relationships already in 
progress. 
 
This point can be seen in any number of further examples. As soon as the 
Algerian war for independence from France drew to a close, the Komsomol 
dispatched a team of sappers to the country in 1962 to begin the process of 
removing mines and other dangerous materiel.26 All manner of Komsomol 
groups were sent to Cuba in the aftermath of revolution there, to help build their 
fishing industry, to develop agriculture and build railways.27 When, in 1968, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
nonetheless been approved by the CPSU leadership before coming to naught. As 
Hoffman notes, the Peace Corps took a rather more ambiguous position in regard 
to its position in the Cold War confrontation.  
26 Yu.A. Padornyi and B.P. Zyryanovyi,  ǯ , ǣǯ SSSR, 1972, p. 82. Strenuous 
efforts were made to cultivate friendship with Algerian Youth, seemingly to little 
avail. At a Dakar meeting in 1970 the Algerians invited a Komsomol delegation to 
Algeria; the Komsomol invited the Algerians to the USSR and promised them 
material help. Nonetheless, over the course of the congress the two parties 
ended up at loggerheads and the above offers were promptly withdrawn before 
the KMO had even left Dakar. RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 520, ll. 1-95. 
27 In October 1961, for example, the Komsomol Central Committee resolved to 
send 300 young agricultural specialists to Cuba for a year to in order to help 
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KMO received a request from Kabul University for a Soviet-Afghan basketball 
exchange, the opportunity was seized upon with some alacrity. As he contacted     Ǯǯ  iety to enquire about the feasibility of 
such a venture, the KMO chairman made Ǯthere is no 
mass Afghan youth movement, and taking into account the importance of its 
political impact on Afghan youth at the present time, we would consider it 
expedient (to approve the ȌǯǤ28 The Komsomol Central Committee also 
sent touring cultural groups to Tanzania and Zambia in 1970 to hold concerts 
and raise money for Ǯ  ǯ     
Portuguese colonies.29 Even before the relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Bangladesh began to develop in the early 1970s, the Komsomol had already 
been building a relationship with the Union of Students of East Pakistan (as the 
country was known prior to independence), sending first a mass of propaganda 
materials in 1969 and then sending a group of professional Komsomol workers 
for direct agitation work the following year.30  
                                                                                                                                                                   Ǯ   ǯǤ   
youth would in turn come to the USSR for study. RGANI, f. 5, op. 31, d. 180, l. 47.    
28 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 5, d. 240, l. 69.  
29 Cultural groups also travelled within Western Europe, and seemingly proved 
popular. See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 3s, l. 31 on performances 
given by Komsomol troupes in Sweden and Iceland during 1962.  
30 The collection of Leniniana included 1,500 Lenin badges, 50 bas-reliefs of 
Lenin, 1,000 postcards of Lenin, 5,000 portraits and 30 busts, along with a 
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The deployment of doctors and medicines also became a significant feature of  ǯ      offensive in the developing 
world. Young Soviet medics travelled with donated medicines and vaccines to 
countries including Congo, Angola and Guinea. Students from across the 
developing world, many of them in receipt of KMO stipends, also learned about 
medicine and healthcare in Soviet institutes.31 Sometimes trips were in response 
to specific events, like the sending of volunteer medics and medicines to Peru in 
the wake of the Ancash earthquake and avalanche at the end of May 1970.32 
Following its assessment that the Sudanese youth movement had started to look 
like a useful partner in the region (see below), a KMO delegation soon visited the 
country, accompanied by a team of four doctors who would spend the next two 
months there.33 A decade later, the KMO reported that Soviet youth were 
working as doctors in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua, as well as sending 
                                                                                                                                                              
number of photo albums and written materials on Lenin, as ǮǯǤ RGANI, f. 89, op. 46, d. 10, ll. 1-14. 
31 In addition to those studying medicine, regular seminars and talks were held 
on issues relating to healthcare in the developing world, blending practical 
advice with political commentary. See, for example, GARF, f. 9576-r, op. 17, d. 9, 
ll. 1- ? ?Ǯǡ ? ? ? ?- ? ?ǯǤ 
32 KMO chairman Yanaev wrote that the Komsomol had sent medicines and 
doctors to help around 45,000 people in Peru. My internatsionalisty, p. 13. 
33 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 520, l. 17.  
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extensive medical supplies to Cambodia.34 In addition to building and reinforcing 
foreign relationships, this was also a theme with domestic purposes, as Soviet 
medical aid to developing countries was repeatedly hailed as evidence of the ǯǤ Moscow Komsomol activists, for 
example, were informed in September 1979 that Komsomol volunteers were 
helping to reduce the 35,000 child deaths each year in the developing world 
from disease.35 Komsomolskaya pravda and other media outlets were likewise 
instructed to provide wide coverage on students from the developing world 
studying in the USSR, emphasising their sense of gratefulness to the Soviet ǡ      Ǯ ǯ   
country: again, using foreigners to demonstrate Soviet benevolence.36  
 
By its very nature the Komsomol was well-suited to carrying out both short-
notice and large-scale international operations as opportunities presented 
themselves. The (relative) youth of its members and the massive size of the 
organisation meant that it was never lacking in skilled people able to drop 
everything and head off elsewhere.37 When a request came in for the USSR to 
                                                        
34 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 182, l. 14.  
35 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 1, d. 3566, l. 13.  
36 T. Krasovitskaya et al eds. ǲǯ  ǳ ǳǣ 
inostrantsev v sovetskom soyuze, 1956-1965, Moskva: Mezhdunarodnyi fond 
Demokratiya, 2013, p. 189.  
37 This was also the case inside the USSR. Calls for young volunteers to up sticks 
and participate in any given construction project at the other end of the (vast) 
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send a paediatrician out to Congo-Brazzaville, or an agronomist to Tanzania, the 
Komsomol could usually find such people within its own ranks with relative 
ease. All that was needed was for the KMO to contact the Komsomol organisation 
of any given university department, factory or sports society, asking that they 
recommend young specialists who might be suitable to serve as translators of 
Urdu for an upcoming trip to Pakistan, or to help develop the finishing industry 
in Cuba, for example.38  
 
All of the above bridge-building activity could be seen especially clearly in regard ǯǯ ? ? ? ?
revolution. Months before the onset of Soviet military action there, the KMO had 
already sent a delegation to Kabul, and in turn received an Afghan delegation in 
Moscow, with the aim of utilising Soviet expertise to help the new regime build 
up the fledgling Democratic Organisation of Afghan Youth (DOMA). In addition to 
the tens of thousands of Komsomol members who served as soldiers or else 
worked in civilian tasks like teaching and medicine, more than 150 specialist 
Komsomol advisers (along with translators, who were mostly drawn from the 
Tadzhik Komsomol) journeyed out there to help establish a political framework 
for DOMA, expand its membership base and reinforce its fighting capacity.39 
                                                                                                                                                              
country were by no means rare. See, for example, C. Ward, ǯ	ǣ
Building of BAM and Late Soviet Socialism, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 
38 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 5, d. 240, ll. 1-355.   
39 See A.G. Belofastov et al eds. Mushavery: neizvestnye stranitsy afganskoi voiny, 
Moskva: Kuchkova pole, 2013.  
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Conditions were, of course, especially dangerous and by no means all came back 
alive, but numerous former Komsomol advisers who served there still speak of a Ǯǯ
Afghanistan.40  
 
Lengthy protocols on co-operation arrangements between the Komsomol and 
DOMA were agreed each year, and testified to a truly substantial drive to win ǮǯǤ41 The Komsomol helped build roads and 
irrigation works, sent equipment to set up recreation societies and patronised 
hospitals. It sent   ǯ ǡ t 
sports stars and cultural figures to impress and inspire local youth, provided 
literature (in Pashtun and Dari) and photo exhibitions that detailed the ǯǡs contribution to the ǯ fight to liquidate illiteracy.42 Musical ensembles, films and projectors 
                                                        
40 ǡǡǤǤǡǮǯǡA.G. Belofastov et al eds, 
Mushavery, pp. 64-81. 
41 Komsomol documents also show some, far more limited, agreements for youth 
organisations in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, and 
Yemen to render additional material assistance, though they did not always fulfil 
their promised contribution. RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 13, d. 21, ll. 1-29.  
42 To give some idea of the scope of this assistance, a 1981 agreement between 
DOMA and the Komsomol included provision for the supply of 400 footballs; 400 
volleyballs; 250 basketballs; 200 tennis balls; 110 chess sets; 500 leotards; 2 
gymnastics mats; 120 tennis rackets; and 100 pairs of dumbbells. Musical 
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were dispatched so that Afghan youth could see Soviet creativity, while Afghan 
specialists were invited to Moscow where they could learn from Soviet youth 
work in television, radio and print journalism.43 All manner of propaganda 
hardware (from projectors and printing presses through to leaflets, megaphones 
and radios) was sent for DOMA use, though ultimately to little avail as the Afghan 
organisation steadfastly refused to take root.44 Nonetheless, the resources that 
were expended on this task, all of which seem to have been drawn from the ǯǡ
as an important player in Soviet efforts at winning the day in Afghanistan.  
 
Central Asian Komsomol organisations were deemed particularly useful for 
demonstrating to Afghan youth the benefits of Soviet-style socialism in a cultural 
context broadly similar to their own. Friendly links were quickly established 
between republican Komsomol branches across the region and Afghan provincial 
                                                                                                                                                              
equipment included 20 accordions; 5 bass guitars; 5 pianos; 15 flutes; 20 
clarinets; and a larger number of traditional Afghan instruments RGASPI, f. m-3, 
op. 13, d. 8, ll. 1-14.  
43 The editorial board of the Afghan youth newspaper Znamya molodezhi, for 
example, was invited to Moscow (at Komsomol expense) to learn best practice at 
the offices of ǯ. RGANI, f. 89, op. 46, d. 74, l. 1.  
44 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 13, d. 8, ll. 1-14. Even as its membership roll grew to over a 
hundred thousand, Komsomol advisers reported that DOMA failed to carry out 
basic tasks like collecting memberships dues, and its military formations simply 
collapsed under pressure.  
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cities. The Uzbek Komsomol established formal ties to the Kabul branch of 
DOMA. The Tadzhik Komsomol linked to DOMA branches in Kunduz; the 
Turkmen Komsomol linked to Herat, and the Kirgiz Komsomol linked to 
Kandahar.45 This is a point worth highlighting. While they did not set any kind of 
independent line in terms of either who to interact with or how to interact, 
republican Komsomol organisations could bring specific strengths to work with 
foreigners, especially those from less developed parts of the world: presenting 
the most enticing image of Soviet development in any given context. A 1980 KMO 
report, for example, wrote that the Uzbek Komsomol School in Tashkent was 
preparing cadres from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Namibia and 
Ethiopia.46 When delegations of Syrian and Congolese youth were brought to the    ? ? ? ?     ǯ    ǡ  
based not in Moscow, which would bear rather limited comparison to their own 
situation at home, but in Grozny, capital of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR.47 In short, 
the Komsomol and the Soviet Union had something for almost everyone in the 
developing world. 
 
At the sharp end of the Cold War 
 
                                                        
45 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 13, d. 4, ll. 20-25.  
46 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 182, l. 11.  
47 Checheno-Ingushskaya oblastnaya Komsomolskaya organizatsiya, 1920-1984: 
tsifry i fakty, pp. 129-131.  
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Komsomol involvement in the developing world also went some considerable 
way beyond offering moral support and issuing declarations of indignation. It 
has already been noted above that the KMO handed out stipends each year for 
students from the developing world to come and study at Soviet institutes.48 
Already by 1961 there were around 15,000 foreigners studying in Soviet higher 
education, and the numbers kept on growing.49 In addition to those who entered 
Soviet education via the proverbial front door, though, there were also a 
considerable number who entered via the back door, for learning of a rather 
more clandestine nature. Over the course of the post-Stalin period thousands of 
students from the First, Second and Third Worlds attended special Komsomol 
schools for training in conducting political work with young people. Data from 
1975 showed that over the previous quarter century the Higher Komsomol 
School had trained almost 7,000 foreign cadres from 91 countries: around 3,000 
of those coming since the turn of the 1970s. The costs for the Komsomol were 
significant, but the results, it seems, were often desirable. Communiques 
received from the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), for example, 
                                                        
48 There was of course a political colouring to these studies. In particular, the 
House of Friendship (Dom druzhba) was set up, with Komsomol assistance, to get 
students from the developing world in particular interacting with their Soviet 
hostsǯ. See, for example, GARF f. 9576-r, op. 17, d. 14, ll. 1-93.  
49 T. Krasovitskaya et al ed. ǲǯ  ǳ ǳ, p. 264-267. 
Figures given here show over one thousand students from Africa, almost seven 
hundred from Southeast Asia, over seven hundred and fifty from the Americas, 
and over two thousand from Arab lands and the Near East.  
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showed that they were very happy with the training that their students received ǮǯǤ50 The longer-term value of all this could be 
seen in the fact that numerous graduates of Komsomol training were reported to 
have subsequently taken up important Party and state posts, or else headed up 
youth works, upon their return home.51  
         ǡ  Ǯ- ǯǡ Ǯ Ȃ ǯǮ   ǯǡ    Ǯ struggle and     ǯǤ52 They attended lectures on topics  Ǯ          -ǯǡ Ǯ-colonialism: the main obstacle to socio-economic progress in ǯǡǮǯǤ The 
subversive nature of the training on offer could be gauged from the fact that in 
1967 the director of the school complained to the Komsomol Central Committee 
                                                        
50 FRELIMO leader Eduardo Mondlane did complain that two of the female 
recruits he had sent to Moscow were found to be pregnant upon their return to 
Mozambique. RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 5, d. 202, ll. 14-16. FRELIMO had been sending 
students to the School since 1962, but the relationship seems to have soured 
following this pregnancy scandal. 
51 RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 1010s, ll. 7-34. Of the 6,815 foreign cadres trained, 
3,617 were from socialist countries, 420 from capitalist countries, 1,004 from 
Latin America, 1,386 from Africa, and 388 from Asia.  
52 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 5, d. 202, l. 18.  
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that too many people were becoming aware of the its existence on the outskirts 
of Moscow (apparently thanks to its African students meeting up with friends at 
Patrice Lumumba University in the city). This, he said, was problematic because 
many of his students were related to prominent figures abroad, were attached to 
illegal parties or were in the country    ǯ . ǯǣ since it had 
already become known, the existing school ought to continue and even receive 
some media coverage, but a brand new, state-of-the-art, Komsomol school 
should also be built, away from prying eyes.53  
 ǯ
especially notable in the conflict. At the end of June 1980, for example, a report 
was sent from the Komsomol Central Committee to the Communist Party Central 
Committee informing that, during the course of recent talks, fraternal youth 
organisations in Latin America had requested urgent financial assistance, and the 
Komsomol was willing to help. The following month the CPSU Central Committee 
Secretariat approved the request. Since a number of the youth organisations in 
question were operating in underground or semi-legal conditions (the position 
in        Ǯ   ǯȌǡ 
                                                        
53 The director laid out very detailed proposals for the new facility, which he 
specified should include 10 auditoriums, facilities for simultaneous translation 
into five different languages, a foreign language library of over 50,000 books, a 
microfilm reading room, a photo laboratory and a canteen capable of serving up 
3,000 meals per day. The projected cost was over 450,000 roubles.    
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was no ambiguity whatever that this was the Komsomol playing a full part in the 
most subversive aspects of the international Cold War struggle. Even though 
permission for the payment had had to be obtained from the Communist Party, 
but the money came from Komsomol coffers: 111,000 roubles from the funds of   ȋ ǯ  Ȍǡ     ? ?ǡ ? ? ? roubles 
from Komsomol Central Committee reserves.54  
 
When they attended international events KMO representatives worked to build 
connections and to expand goodwill toward the Soviet regime. Dozens of 
invitations were handed out at such occasions, bringing existing friends and Ǯǯa little glad-handing. A report following 
the 1967 International Student Union congress in Mongolia, for example, stated 
that ǯ invitations to 
the USSR to youth groups from twenty six countries.55 Leaders of foreign youth 
                                                        
54 RGANI, f. 89, op. 39, d. 24, ll. 1-5. This aid was to be distributed as follows: 
Argentina Ȃ 20,000 roubles; Chile Ȃ 16,000; Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, Costa 
Rica, Peru and Panama Ȃ 7,000 each; Bolivia and Ecuador Ȃ 5,000; El Salvador 
and Uruguay Ȃ 3,000 and an additional 10,000 for the Sandinista youth 
movement in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the available documents do not give any 
indication of exactly what the requested financial aid was to be used for.  
55 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 239, ll. 73-75.  
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organisations were also invited to Soviet sanatoria for spells of rest and 
recuperation, again at the expense of the Komsomol.56  
 
Alongside the networking opportunities that such international events 
presented, they also proved to be a useful source of intelligence. Indeed, talented 
Komsomol workers were consistently an important pool for KGB recruitment, 
including for operatives in its First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), and 
the security organs were anyway intimately connected to any kind of foreign 
activity by Soviet organisations. In its dealings with youth groups across Africa, 
Asia and Latin America the KMO regularly fed back to the Communist Party and 
KGB their insights on the shifting tides within radical political movements across 
the world.57 Following the 1965 Havana meeting on colonialism in Latin America 
the KMO reported that Cuba had established itself as the leading actor in world 
student politics, and was showing increasing independence from Moscow in the 
region: a theme which would soon resound for years to come as Fidel Castro 
asserted himself in Latin America and Southern Africa.58  
 
                                                        
56 See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 1081, ll. 8-9, in which the 
Komsomol Central Committee requests permission from the CPSU Central 
Committee to invite youth leaders (along with their wives and children) from 37 
different countries to the USSR during the summer of 1977.   
57 See, for example, RGANI, f. 89, op. 27, d. 33, ll. 1-8.   
58 See RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 74, ll. 1-398; and f. m-3, op. 3, d. 239, ll. 1-241.  
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Chinese attempts to undermine Soviet positions on any number of issues within 
the world of youth politics were a regular source vituperative criticism in KMO 
reports. When divisions opened up within the IUS at its December 1964 congress 
in Sofia, for example, KMO representatives claimed that China had long been Ǯǯǡ
submitting a list of those delegations which supported the Chinese line on any 
given question and those whose commitment to the Soviet line seemed to be 
wavering.59 From the Pan-African Congress at Dakar in 1975, Komsomol advice 
was that the Sudanese youth movement was starting to look like a useful partner 
in the region, and it would be a good idea to strengthen links with both 
Tanzanian and Zambian youth movements as those countries took their first 
post-independence steps (both would ultimately move closer to China than to 
the USSR). As a foretaste of frictions yet to come inside the socialist bloc, it was 
also reported from Dakar that the Romanian delegation at the Congress had at 
times sided with the Chinese instead of the Soviet position, had broken rules of     Ǯ ǯǤ 60  While snippets of 
information such as this did not on their own shape the Soviet foreign policy 
agenda, they were undoubtedly of value to a Party-state leadership fearful of the 
                                                        
59 RGASPI, f.m-3, op. 3, d. 73, ll. 1-4. Those delegations who were reported to have 
sided with China included Albania, North Korea, Indonesia, Zanzibar, Guadeloupe 
and North Vietnam. Those seeming to be wavering from a pro-Soviet position 
included delegations from Colombia, Cambodia, French Guyana, and Surinam.  
60 See RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 520, ll. 1-18. A Komsomol delegation was duly sent 
to Sudan (see above).  
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ideological challenge coming from China, concerned about the cohesion of the 
socialist bloc and aware that it had already backed the wrong horse more than 
enough times in the developing world, losing considerable resources and no 
small measure of prestige in the process.61  
 
As with CIA funding of public organisations aimed at shaping public opinion 
against communism, the Komsomol had a number of key vessels that it utilised 
in getting the Soviet message across to foreign youth.62 Set up immediately after 
the Secon  ǯ ǡ    	   
(WFDY) and the International Union of Students (IUS) were officially non-
aligned organisations that proved central actors in international youth politics 
on the political left, organising all manner of showpiece events such as the World 
Youth Festivals and international student congresses. Although the Soviet side 
repeatedly denied commandeering for itself the leading role in world leftist 
youth politics, both the WFDY and IUS were intimately connected to the upper 
reaches of the Komsomol (and through that, the top Soviet leadership) 
                                                        
61 As Jonathan Haslam has observed, in spite of the condemnation heaped on      ? ? ? ?   Ǯ ǯǡ 
blunders of the Brezhnev years were at least as egregious. J. Haslam, ǯ
Cold War, London: Yale University Press, 2011, p. 270. 
62 On this theme in the US Cold War, see, for example, F. Saunders, Who Paid the 
Piper: the CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London: Granta, 2000.  
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throughout the period.63 During the mid-to-late 1950s both Aleksandr Shelepin 
and Vladimir Semichastnyi held the post of vice-president of the WFDY whilst 
concurrently serving as Komsomol first secretary.64 Even after this very obvious 
connection was scaled back, both the IUS and the WFDY turned to the Komsomol 
for financial help at different stages over the ensuing decades, and both duly 
received assistance totaling at least tens of thousands of dollars.65 
 
As with Western attempts to keep hidden CIA funding of seemingly independent 
organisations like the Congress for Cultural Freedom, there was clear awareness 
that while organisations like the WFDY should serve Soviet purposes, their 
effectiveness would be undermined if the link back to the kremlin became too 
explicit. Internal KMO reports showed that efforts at achieving any kind of unity 
or backing for Soviet positions were badly hampered by foreign policy events 
                                                        
63 Vladimir Semichastnyi, for example, took to the pages of ǯ
pravda in 1 ? ? ?         ǯ ȋǯȌǮǯ
in the affairs of fraternal organisations and claiming for itself the leading role 
among socialist youth. ǯaya pravda, 25 January 1959, p. 5.   
64 See V. Semichastnyi, Bespokoinoe serdtse, Moskva: Vagrius, 2002, p. 384. 
65 For example, in the mid-1960s, as the IUS hit financial problems once China 
stopped paying its dues, the Komsomol bailed it out to the tune of $17,000. 
RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 73, ll. 118-119. In May 1979 10,000 roubles worth of 
emergency financial assistance also passed from the Komsomol to the WFDY. 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 31, d. 2, l. 1. 
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like the invasions of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the military 
action in Afghanistan from 1979.66 As such, there was a growing awareness that 
influence ought to be discrete, where possible. When the Sino-Soviet split began 
to impact upon the world of youth politics in the early 1960s, and 
representatives of the Labour Union of Youth of Albania publically criticized 
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, the Albanians soon found themselves expelled 
from the IUS. The KMO was unquestionably the driving force behind the move, 
with its representative Vladimir Yarovoi drafting the IUS response to the ǯ attacks on Khrushchev. Yarovoi also noted in private correspondence Ǯǥ and people do not 
start to say that the IU   ǲ  ǳ Ȃ this would play into ǯǯǤ67  
 
In much the same way that the CIA used its secret patronage of the National 
Student Association in the 1950s and 1960s to ameliorate (and report upon) 
anti-US sentiment in a range of international youth organisations, the Komsomol 
worked to do the exact opposite: seemingly with considerable success.68 Even 
when they attended overseas events officially as observers rather than active 
participants, KMO representatives were working behind the scenes to push the 
                                                        
66 See, for example, MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 182, ll. 1-26. 
67 RGASPI, f. m-1s, op. 1s, d. 3s, ll. 6-11.  
68       ǡ  Ǥ  ǡ Ǯ  ? ? ? ?  
Agency Scandal: Catalyst in a Transforming Relationship between State and ǯǡJournal of American History, Vol. 98, No. 4 (2012), pp. 1075-1092.  
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Soviet line on any given question. It was influence that the KMO exerted in these 
forums, rather than control, but they did seem to achieve desired results more 
often than not.69 They fought to stifle or rebuff open criticism of the USSR and its 
allies, and to paper over differences between ideologically diverse parties, often 
downplaying overt language of socialism and instead foregrounding the 
importance of unity in resistance to the evils of imperialiǤ Ǯǯǡ  ǡ
really meant being united behind the Soviet position. At the 1965 Havana 
meeting on the liquidation of colonialism in Latin America, for example, they 
fought hard to achieve a resolution which stated that the fight against 
imperialism in Latin America could not be separated from the struggles going on 
at the same time in Asia and Africa and declared as martyrs of the cause Patrice 
Lumumba, Nguyen-Van-Troi and Pedro Albizu Campos.70 Particular care was 
taken to ensure that some kind of condemnation of the US made it into the 
resolutions and communiqués that would be broadcast to the outside world 
                                                        
69  KMO reports repeatedly indicated that anti-communist and anti-Soviet 
speeches were made at some events. At the 1967 MSS congress in Ulan Bator, for ǡ Ǯ   - ǯ    
rostrum by Brazilian, Puerto Rican, and Ecuadorian delegations, among others. 
See RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 239, l. 2.  
70 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 74, ll. 1-398. It is worth noting that this trio ǮǯǡǤ 
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from such events.71 This was far easier than achieving any kind of pro-Soviet 
statement. The resolution from the end of the 1965 meeting included     Ǯ      ǯ     Ǯ       ǯǮǯǡ
economic exploitation of the developing world by large American corporations.72 
At the end of the 1970 Pan-African congress, the final resolution included the  Ǯ  Ȃ with the USA at its head Ȃ is the enemy of all 
peoples of the developing countries of Aǡ    ǯǤ73 Such 
statements were mere token gestures but it is worth remembering that both 
sides in the Cold War placed a high priority on being seen to occupy Ǯǯ Ǯǯ.  
 
The Vietnam War in particular gave the Komsomol ample opportunity to stir 
youth opinion against the US, both at home and abroad. Accordingly, the 
Komsomol Central Committee did all it could to milk the available opportunities: 
filling the pages of ǯwith stories and images of suffering; 
bringing Vietnamese youth to the USSR to tell of US barbarities; mobilising young 
people to raise funds; and facilitating pen-pal exchanges between school pupils. 
                                                        
71 Various documents show that Cuban delegations helped the KMO in securing 
consensus for such statements. See, for example, RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 239, ll. 
1-241 on the 1967 IUS congress in Ulan-Bator.   
72 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 74, ll. 1-21.  
73 RGASPI, f. m-3, op. 3, d. 520, l. 7.  
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Much as events like these were clearly orchestrated from above, it seems that 
plenty of young people in the USSR did feel passionate in their opposition to the 
war, just as young people did in other parts of the world.74 In such contexts, one 
did not always have to be a communist zealot to Ǯ   ǯ   Ǥ         
fellow students at Moscow State University in the  ? ? ? ?ǣǮ
American intervention in Vietnam not because of Pravda, but in ǯǤ75 
 
The implicit link between divisive Soviet action abroad and sharpening 
Komsomol discourse on its Cold War rival resurfaced in 1968, just as events in 
Czechoslovakia (and mounting repression against the emergent human rights 
movement) saw Soviet international prestige plummet and again roused disquiet 
among young people at home.76 The rhetoric on Vietnam grew ever more 
bellicoseǤ      ǡ   Ǯ  
practising sadism like the Gestapo and the whole world sees their racism, like 
                                                        
74  Ǥǡ Ǯ  ǣ
and Public Organizations, 1965- ? ? ? ?ǯǡunpublished manuscript. Thanks to Julie 
Hessler for sharing this draft article.  
75 W. Taubman, The View from the ǣǯ
Soviet Youth in Ferment, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968, p. 164.  
76 The period following the entry of Soviet forces into Afghanistan showed much 
the same tendency, though that time the focus fell mostly upon resistance to the 
US stationing Pershing-2 missiles in Europe.  
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ǯǤ77 A Komsomol Central Committee resolution     Ǯ     ǯǡ 
championed initiatives in which pupils across multiple cities collected school 
supplies for dispatch to fraternal youth in Vietnam, organised subbotniki 
(voluntary work days) in which young people collected scrap metal and waste 
paper in their spare time, or else staged cultural events from which proceeds 
would be directed toward a Vietnam Solidarity Fund.78  
 
In January 1973 the Belorussian Komsomol held protest meetings against the 
massive US bombardment of North Vietnam, hearing first hand from Vietnamese 
students of the horrors they had experienced and of their gratefulness toward 
the Soviet Union.79 In Georgia Komsomol members held a regular week of 
solidarity with Vietnamese youth in January each year, staging concerts and ǡǯǤ80 According 
to official sources, that fǮǡ
bicycles, transistor radio receivers, photographic and cinema equipment, 
                                                        
77 TsAOPIM, f. 2907, op. 1, d. 164, l. 15.  
78 Ǯ
boryushchimsya narodom i molǯ ǯ  ǲ  Ȃ ǯǳǯ  Dokumenty TsK VLKSM: 1968, Moskva: Molodaya gvardiya, 1969, 
pp. 228-9.  
79 NARB (Minsk), f. 63, op. 19, d. 34, l. 73. 
80 MIA, f. 96, op. 25, d. 68, ll. 1-5 (1973) and f. 96, op. 23, d. 157, ll. 1-10 (1969).  
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ǯǤ81 Aside from the material assistance rendered 
to the Vietnamese, this was a way for young people to become a functioning part 
of the Soviet system and the global movement which it stood atop: a chance to 
participate in national and international political life and to engage with a theme 
that demonstrably had wide support across the globe. Much the same can be said 
of strenuous efforts made by the KMO to place Soviet youth in the front row of 
global campaigns for nuclear disarmament. In the early 1980s, for example, the 
Komsomol orchestrated a public campaign that saw postcards and letters of 
protest to the White House, signed by almost 4,500,000 young people.82 
Similarly, a Komsomol initiative in Estonia had seen over 1,500 postcards sent to 
imprisoned Chilean communist leader Luis Corvalan to mark his birthday in 
1976 while local youth learned Chilean songs and exchanged gifts with Chilean ǮǯǤ83 As Gleb Tsipursky has recently noted in regard to all 
manner of recreation societies on offer for Soviet youth, this was also a way of Ǯǯǡ
influences were being embedded.84 
 
Television and radio shows on youth abroad highlighted struggles taking place 
the world over. The pages of ǯ  and other youth press 
consistently ran images and reports of police violence, protests, poverty and 
                                                        
81 M.M. Mukhamedzhanov et al eds. My internatsionalisty, p. 11.  
82 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 182, ll. 1-18. 
83 AIS (Tallinn), f. 31, op. 127, d. 111, ll. 1-2.  
84 See G. TsipurskyǡǮ	ǯǤ 
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systemic racism in the American Deep South, South Africa, Chile and many 
others. Indeed, there was never any shortage of themes with which to get 
involved. At the XVII Komsomol congress in April 1974 the KMO spoke of its 
solidarity campaigns with embattled youth movements in Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Angola, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.85 By 1979 it was 
running concurrent campaigns of solidarity with young people in Laos, 
Cambodia, Nicaragua, Palestine, Chile, and Uruguay, to name just a few.86 Attacks 
on extensive political repression under the US- ǯ  
ǡ  ǯ   	ǯ    Ǥ
Moscow Komsomol activists were reminded that Ǯ that there 
are bloody regimes in Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay, South Africa and suffering 
among the Arabs in Palestineǯ.87 While they very predictably neglected to 
mention a long and lamentable history of human rights abuses perpetrated by 
the Soviet regime   ǡ       Ǯ ǯ
USSR could situate itself as a force for good in the outside world, even as it was 
demonstrably failing to overhaul the West in terms of living standards at home.   
 
Discourse on the Komsomol contribution to struggles in the developing world 
also plugged Soviet youth into their own ǯ Ǯ ǯǤ Evgenyi ǯǯcited at the opening of this essay made clear that there 
                                                        
85 RGASPI, f. 6, op. 17, d. 88, l. 18. 
86 MIA, f. 96, op. 27, d. 182, l. 14. 
87 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 1, d. 3566, l. 1-2. 
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  Ǯǯ           
1930s, the defeat of the Nazis in the 1940s and volunteers who headed out to 
Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1950s and beyond. One might even say that 
the developing world was meant to serve as the last bastion of romanticism 
during a time of apparently declining communist idealism inside the USSR. All 
manner of sources have spoken of the rejuvenated sense of idealism that 
followed the Cuban revolution.88 Similarly, the resolution of a meeting of 
Komsomol activists in Daugavpils (Latvia) in June 1967, during the Six Day War 
between Israel and its Arab neighboursǡǮ
fraternal help to our Arab friends at any time, ǯǤ89  
 
Conclusions 
 
One must, of course, take care not to set too much store by such remarks 
contained in official (though private) Komsomol documents like that cited above. 
Indeed, there were at least some instances in which citizens showed themselves 
openly resentful of Soviet resources being lavished on foreigners and foreign 
causes.90 ǡ    ǯ      Ǯ      ǯǡ  
                                                        
88 See, for example, A. Mikoyan, Tak eto bylo: razmiyshleniya o minuvshem, 
Moskva: Vagrius, 1999; B. Pastukhov, Druzei moikh prekrasnye cherty, Moskva: 
Molodaya gvardiya, 2012, p. 48.  
89 LVA (Riga), f. 201, op. 3, d. 28, l. 1.  
90 See R. Hornsby, Protest, Reform and Repression. 
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this remark might well also be taken as a personal viewpoint being transposed 
into a generalised one.91 As noted above, there is every sign that various 
international issues Ȃ such as support for Vietnam and Cuba, opposition to 
colonial regimes in southern Africa and to the likes of the Pinochet regime in 
Chile Ȃ resonated deeply with lots of young people and won the Soviet regime 
some genuine credibility in places. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the 
inexorable growth of Western cultural influence among Soviet youth showed 
that the Komsomol narrative on the outside world had not produced anything 
like a comprehensive rejection of Western capitalist modernity.92 
   ? ? ? ? Ǯ
in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Southern Yemen and Afghanistan have opened           ǯǤ93 In reality, of 
course, they had done no such thing: though it is certainly curious to note this 
particularly ill-starred quintet of regimes being proffered to Soviet youth as 
harbingers of the shining future for socialism. By that stage, of course, it was 
                                                        
91  D. Raleigh,   ǣ     ǯ  
Generation, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 158. 
92  On this theme see in particular the works of Sergei Zhuk, including Ǯǯ  ǣ      ǯǡCold War History, 14: 4, pp. 593-617; S. 
Zhuk, Rock and Roll in the Rocket City: the West, Identity and Ideology in Soviet 
Dniepropetrovsk, 1960-1985, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.    
93 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 1, d. 3566, l. 13. 
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much easier to present the benefits and achievements of Soviet socialism with 
reference to unseen events and processes taking place in the far away 
developing world, rather than by reference to the ossifying regime that Soviet 
youth experienced in their everyday lives.  
 
As efforts at moulding a consensus of opposition to the Vietnam War showed, 
there was some considerable scope for giving the US a bloody nose in the global ǤǡǡǮǯ
Soviet model to the rest of the world. When and where the Soviet regime did 
enjoy international success, the Komsomol was often involved on some level: 
whether sending out resources and expertise to build and consolidate 
relationships or else training up and equipping those who would do the fighting 
on the ground.    
 
 
 
 
  
  
